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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark Lee Ellis appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of his
post-conviction petition.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The following facts and proceedings of Ellis’s underlying criminal
proceeding are derived from the district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss:
Mr. Ellis had been convicted of possession of sexually
exploitive material and had been released on parole at the time of
the current offense. On March 17, 2010, Ellis was arrested on an
agent’s warrant. While incarcerated, he instructed a neighbor to
remove a methamphetamine pipe, drugs, DVDs and cell phones
located in a storage room adjacent to his apartment. However, the
neighbor called his parole officer and told him Ellis’s request. The
parole officer, police and the landlord conducted a search of the
storage room and found DVDs, drug paraphernalia, controlled
substances and cell phones in the storage room. When a detective
looked at the content of the DVD’s, he realized they contained child
pornography.
Subsequently, Ellis was charged in the current case with ten
new counts of possession of sexually exploitive material and a
sentencing enhancement for a prior conviction of a registerable sex
offense. Each count of possession of a sexually exploitive material
carried with it a maximum 10 year prison sentence.
The
enhancement requires the sitting judge to sentence the defendant
to a mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison. Ellis filed a motion
to suppress the evidence, which was denied by the district court
because Ellis had signed a valid Fourth Amendment waiver as a
part of his parole agreement. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial of the suppression motion. State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584,
314 P.3d 639, (Ct. App. 2013), review denied (Dec. 23, 2013).
After the Court entered its Order denying Ellis’s motion to
suppress, Ellis decided to enter into a plea agreement. The plea
agreement allowed Ellis to appeal the district court’s decision. In
the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss eight counts of
possession of sexually exploitive material and the enhancement
1

(with the mandatory minimum) in exchange for Ellis’s guilty plea to
two counts.
The State agreed to cap their sentencing
recommendation to a total of five years determinate and ten years
indeterminate.
....
[At the plea entry hearing] [t]he Court ensured Ellis had read,
understood and completed the Guilty Plea Form. Ellis told the
Court he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up his
constitutional right to a trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Ellis admitted to downloading the two DVDs containing child
pornography. The Court accepted the guilty pleas and found that
Ellis understood the nature of the offenses, the consequences of
pleading guilty, and that the pleas were freely and voluntarily made.
At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the sentence
agreed upon in the plea bargain.
(R., pp.84-87 (internal citations omitted).)
Ellis filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, presenting the
following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (a) failing to “give
an argument on the motion to suppress or call witnesses for [Ellis’s] behalf[,]” (b)
allowing “an intern to write motions, work on [his] case and negotiate plea
agreement[,]” and (c) failing to allow Ellis “to see [his] full discovery, evidence
used against [him] or to review [his] pre-sentence investigation[,]” and (2) “[his]
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered because [he] was unable to review
[his] full discovery or pre-sentence investigation.” (R., pp.4-5.) Ellis also filed a
motion for appointment of counsel, which was denied. (R., pp.16-19, 21.)
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal.

(R.,

pp.24-67 (including Exhibits).) As summarized by the district court, the state
argued that Ellis’s affidavit failed to “assert facts giving rise to a valid claim of

2

ineffective assistance of counsel because he has not shown prejudice” and “that
the record belies Ellis’s claims that he did not knowingly or competently enter his
guilty plea.” (R., p.88.)
Ellis filed an affidavit in response to the State’s motion for summary
dismissal (R., pp.68-77), which, according to the district court, did not “allege any
facts to show his attorney was unprepared at the suppression hearing, rather he
alleged facts that show he and his attorney disagreed on the presentation of
evidence” (R., p.88). The court explained that Ellis’s response stated “his plea
could not have been competently entered because he was ‘scared’ and ‘just said
what [he] thought would make the court happy about the questions asked.’” (Id.)
After reviewing Ellis’s affidavit in response to its motion for summary
dismissal, the state filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Dismissal (R., pp.7879), arguing that Ellis’s “response adds nothing new to his petition” (id., at 78).
The district court issued a Second Order Denying Counsel (R., pp.81-82), finding
no possibility that a valid claim exists because “a reasonable person with
adequate means would not be willing to retain counsel at his or her own expense
to conduct a further investigations into the claims” (id., p.81).
The district court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss setting forth its
grounds for summarily dismissing Ellis’s claims and giving him 20 days to file a
response. (R., pp.83-99.) After Ellis filed an affidavit in response to the district
court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.100-114), the court entered an Order of
Dismissal and a Final Judgment. (R., pp.115-119.) Ellis filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. (R., pp.125-128.)

3

ISSUE
Ellis’s Appellant’s Brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal
as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4).
The state phrases the issue as:
Has Ellis failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?

4

ARGUMENT
Ellis Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
In the opening paragraph of his “Appellant’s Brief,” Ellis states, “I am

resubmitting my two prior briefs presented to the district court as my appellants
[sic] brief.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.1.)

Ellis’s Appellant’s Brief is comprised of

copies of (1) his affidavit in response to the district court’s Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, and (2) his affidavit in response to the state’s motion for summary
dismissal. (See generally Appellant’s Brief.)
Ellis has not presented any issues on appeal, much less argument or
authority to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition.
Therefore, Ellis has waived any and all issues on appeal. In any event, the
district court properly summarily dismissed all of Ellis’s post-conviction claims
because his pleadings failed to present a genuine issue of material fact that
would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
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State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than “a short and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. Id. (citing I.C. § 194903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative.

“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
6

claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not
entitle the petitioner to relief, the district court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).

“Allegations contained in the

application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.” Id.

7

D.

Ellis Has Failed To Show Error Because He Has Failed To Present Any
Issue, Much Less Argument And Authority In Support Of An Issue, To
Challenge The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His Claims
After the district court issued its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Ellis filed an

affidavit in response. (R., pp.100-115.) The court issued an Order of Dismissal
stating that, although Ellis’s affidavit “generally rehashes arguments raised in his
petition, he did bring up several new facts that warrant brief discussion.” (R.,
p.115.) After analyzing the additional facts, the court concluded:
Considering his most recent filings, the Petitioner has not
asserted any new evidence which creates a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his previously raised claims and has not
asserted a genuine issue of material fact regarding any new claim
for post-conviction relief.
(R., p.118.)
On appeal, Ellis does not assign any specific error to the district court’s
Notice of Intent to Dismiss or its Order of Dismissal, but instead simply attaches
the affidavits he filed in response to those orders to a page entitled “Appellant’s
Brief.” This Court may affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of Ellis’s
petition on the ground that he failed to assign specific error to the district court,
and he has failed to present any authority and argument in support of any claim
of error. It is well settled that the appellate court will not review actions of the
district court for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search
the record for errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23
(1983); Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue
will not be considered if “either authority or argument is lacking” and declining to
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consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single authority or
legal proposition to support his argument”).
E.

Ellis Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Summary
Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Claims
Even if Ellis’s post-conviction claims are considered on appeal, he has

failed to show any error by the district court in summarily dismissing them. In
dismissing Ellis’s post-conviction petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated
all of Ellis’s claims and supporting evidence and correctly determined, based
upon the applicable legal standards and underlying criminal record, that Ellis
failed to set forth adequate facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling
him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his post-conviction claims. (See R.,
pp.83-99, 115-118.) The state adopts as its argument on appeal the district
court’s analysis, as set forth in both its February 4, 2015 (filing date) Notice Of
Intent To Dismiss (R., pp.83-99) and its April 3, 2015 (filing date) Order of
Dismissal (R., pp.115-118). For this Court’s convenience, copies of the district
court’s opinions are appended to this brief. (See Appendices A and B.)
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order summarily dismissing Ellis’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney_______________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of February, 2016, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MARK LEE ELLIS
IDOC #65365
ISCC – UNIT J
P. O. BOX 70010
BOISE, ID 83707

JCM/dd

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

10

____

APPENDIX A

,-----~-------------------------------·-·---

•

•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

:. \I' .4.:;: '%____
FEB O4 2015
CHAISTOPHl,R D. RICH, Clerk
ByTAAA VILLEREAL

MARK LEE ELLIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_____________

) Case No.: CV-PC-2014-09105
)
) NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DePVTY

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), this Court hereby notifies the above parties of its
intention to dismiss the application for post-conviction relief in the above-captioned case.

I.
INTRODUCTION

This action is brought by the petitioner Mark Lee Ellis pursuant to the Unifonn PostConviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code§§ 19-4901 through 19-4911. Pursuant to Idaho Code§
19-4906(b), the Court having considered the application and the record, is satisfied that Ellis is
not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.
Ellis will have an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal within twenty (20) days as
provided by law.
Notice - 1

000083

•

•
II.
BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Ellis had been convicted of possession of sexually exploitive material and had been
released on parole at the time of the current offense. On March 17, 2010, Ellis was arrested on
an agent's warrant. While incarcerated, he instructed a neighbor to remove a methamphetamine
pipe, drugs, DVDs and cell phones located in a storage room adjacent to his apartment.
However, the neighbor called his parole officer and told him Eilis's request. The parole officer,
police and the landlord conducted a search of the storage room and found DVDs, drug
paraphernalia, controlled substances and cell phones in the storage room. When a detective
looked at the content of the DVD's, he realized they contained child pornography.
Subsequently, Ellis was charged in the current case with ten new counts of possession of
sexually exploitive material and a sentencing enhancement for a prior conviction of a
registerable sex offense. Each count of possession of a sexually exploitive material carried with
it a maximum IO year prison sentence. The enhancement requires the sitting judge to sentence
the defendant to a mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison. Ellis filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, which was denied by the district court because Ellis had signed a valid Fourth
Amendment waiver as a part of his parole agreement. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of the suppression motion. State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584,314 P.3d 639, (Ct. App. 2013),
review denied (Dec. 23, 2013).
After the Court entered its Order denying Eilis's motion to suppress, Ellis decided to
enter into a plea agreement. The plea agreement allowed Ellis to appeal the district court's
decision. In the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss eight counts of possession of

Notice - 2
000084

•

•

sexually exploitive material and the enhancement (with the mandatory minimum) in exchange
for Eilis's guilty plea to two counts. The State agreed to cap their sentencing recommendation to
a total of five years determinate and ten years indeterminate. At the entry of plea hearing on
June 8, 2011, Ellis indicated that he had not reviewed all discovery. At this point, the Court
decided to continue the Entry of Plea Hearing.
THE COURT: ... [T]he defendant needs to know all the evidence
that's against him. He needs to have a full review of the discovery
in the case, and to be fully advised of his rights and defenses and
the consequences of a guilty plea.
MR. SMITH: Right.
THE COURT: And if that is something that you can accomplish in
this time period, fine. But if that's something we need other
counsel for, that's also fine. I would be glad to do it with whoever
is prepared to proceed.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, he has a comment for the court.
Maybe that would be THE COURT: We can set if for 9:30 on Monday, since you are
here already, counsel. But, that's what I need, is to - I want to
know that he's been fully advised of the discovery, that he has
gone over the discovery, and that he is comfortable and
understands his rights and his defenses and the consequences of a
guilty plea and that he is prepared to go forward at that time.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, he is telling me that he has been told
what's on the DVDs and to his satisfaction he believes that's what
is there without actually having to see them.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will set it over for Monday at 9:30.
MR. SMITH: Okay.
Tr.16:5-25, 17:1-7. On Monday, June 13, 2011, court reconvened and immediately took up
whether the defendant was ready to proceed.
THE COURT: Well, where are we on this case? I continued this
to an additional time because it did seem to me that the defendant
needed to have more questions answered.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I think the question that caused a little
Notice - 3
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bit of the problem was whether or not Mr. Ellis had been able to
observe or was aware of all of the discovery.
It came down to this crux, that he is willing to admit that he
downloaded what he believed to be child pornography, and that the
position taken by Mr. - by Curtis [lead counsel], who has the case,
is that they couldn't view that child pornography without
[breaking] a law, and my client's aware of all of that and has been
provided with everything else with discovery, and I think he is
willing to admit that he downloaded child pornography.
THE COURT: He downloaded it and burned it to the disc?
MR. SMITH: Correct.
Tr., 18:5-25. The Court determined that the defendant could proceed to the plea colloquy. The
Court questioned Ellis on whether he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily:
Q [by The Court]. Has anyone promised you that I would be easy

on you if you would plead guilty?
A [by The Defendant). No.

Q, Has anybody made any promises to you that I have not heard
today?
A. No. No, ma'am. No, Your Honor.
Q. Okay. Has anyone intimidated or threatened you or anyone
close to you to make you plead guilty?

A. No.
Q, Has anyone offered you a reward or incentive to plead guilty?

A. No.

Q, Are you pleading guilty even though you think you are not
guilty?
A. No.
Tr., 22:9-24. The Court then inquired at length on whether Ellis felt mentally competent to enter
his plea. Although Ellis had mental health issues in the past, he stressed he felt competent to
enter his plea.
Q. Are you having trouble concentrating?

Notice - 4
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A. I'm very anxious, but I understand what is going on.
Q. Okay. Do you have any trouble reading and understanding
what you are reading?

A. No, ma'am.
Q. Have you had any trouble understanding your attorney?

A. No.
Q. Are you having any problems understanding what's going on
today?

A. No.
Q. So you can watch TV and understand what's on?

A. Yes.
Q. You can read and you understand what you are reading?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You may feel some level of anxiety, but you can still
function?
A. Yes.

Tr., 25:13-25, 26:1-7. The Court ensured Ellis had read, understood and completed the Guilty
Plea Form. Tr., 28. Ellis told the Court he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up
his constitutional right to a trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and
the privilege against self-incrimination. Tr., 27:15-20. Ellis admitted to downloading the two
DVDs containing child pornography. Tr., 29-30. The Court accepted the guilty pleas and found
that Ellis understood the nature of the offenses, the consequences of pleading guilty, and that the
pleas were freely and voluntarily made. Tr., 32:8-16.
At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the sentence agreed upon in the plea
bargain.
After Eilis's appeal was denied, he timely filed his petition for post-conviction relief. He
alleged his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered

Notice - 5
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because he had not reviewed discovery or his PSI. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
based on his attorney not calling witnesses or arguing on his behalf at the suppression hearing,
allowing an intern to ''write motions, work on my case and negotiate plea agreement," not
reviewing the DVDs prior to pleading guilty and not reviewing his PSI.
The State filed a combined answer and brief in support of summary dismissal and the
State filed a motion for summary dismissal. The State argues Eilis's affidavit does not assert
facts giving rise to a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he has not shown
prejudice. The State also argues that the record belies Eilis's claims that he did not knowingly or
competently enter his guilty plea. Ellis filed an affidavit in response to the State's motion.
However, Ellis failed to allege any facts to show his attorney was unprepared at the suppression
hearing, rather he alleged facts that show he and his attorney disagreed on the presentation of
evidence. Ellis stated his plea could not have been competently entered because he was "scared"
and ''just said what I thought would make the court happy about the questions asked." Aff. of
Ellis in Response at 5.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief commences a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,
which is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443,
180 P.3d 476,482 (2008); Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,724,202 P.3d 642,646 (2008). The
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for
post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d
Notice - 6
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1216, 1220 (1990); Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 795-796, 291 P.3d 474, 478-479
(Ct.App.2012), review denied (Dec. 14, 2012). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from
a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must contain more than "a short and
plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). State v.
Payne, 146 Idaho 548,560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); Schultz, 153 Idaho at 796,291 P.3d at
479. The petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached,
or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included. LC. § 19-4903.
"To justify an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must tender a factual showing based on
evidence that would be admissible at the hearing." Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 903, 277
P.3d 1050, 1055 (Ct.App.2012). "The petitioner must support the petition with written
statements from witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their
knowledge or otherwise based upon verifiable information." Id. When the petition, affidavits,
and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to
relief, the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Olsen v. State, 156 Idaho 922, 925, 332
P.3d 834,837 (Ct.App.2014), review denied (Sept. 10, 2014). When a genuine issue of material
fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Id.
LC. § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief,
either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative, if "it appears from the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When the district court considers
summary dismissal, it must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor; but the court is not
Notice - 7
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required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw. Joyner v. Stale, 156 Idaho 223,226, 322 P.3d
305, 308 (Ct.App.2014). The district court may summarily dismiss claims if the petitioner's
allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if
the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter oflaw. Jd

IV.
DISCUSSION

A. Involuntary Guilty Plea Claim
Ellis argues he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered. Ellis argues his plea was involuntary because he had not reviewed the
DVDs in discovery and had not reviewed his PSI. When a plea is entered on the advice of
counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' "McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho
847,850, 103 P.3d 460,463 (2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366,
369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 208 (1985)). The claims that Ellis failed to review the DVDs and the PSI
will be analyzed under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.
Ellis argues counsel was ineffective because counsel did not call certain witnesses or
argue at the suppression hearing, utilized an intern, did not review the DVDs with Ellis and did
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not review the PSI with Ellis.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396,409,327 P.3d 372,385,
(Ct.App.2013), review denied (July 1, 2014). The Court applies the two-prong Strickland test to
determine if a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in situations where the
petitioner has entered a plea of guilty. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.3d 255,260
(2011). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that
the attorney's performance was deficient and the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.

Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,
693-94 (1984); Selfv. State, 145 Idaho 578,580, 181 P.3d 504,506 (Ct.App.2007). To establish
a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard ofreasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176
(1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,442, 163 P.3d 222,231 (Ct.App.2007). To establish
prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at
761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231.
Idaho has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of counsel
will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales v.

State, 151 Idaho 168, 172,254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct.App.2011). "Under the Strickland standard,
counsel is 'strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise ofreasonable professional judgment."' Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159,
165, 321 P.3d 709, 715 (2014)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d
Notice - 9
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at 695).
1. Conduct at Suppression Hearing was Not Objectively Unreasonable or Prejudicial.

Ellis argues counsel was objectively unreasonable at the suppression hearing because he
did not call Eilis's parole officer as a witness and did not submit oral argument. Under the first
prong of the Strickland test, Ellis must show that his counsel's performance was deficient. The
first prong requires the Court to utilize an "objective standard of reasonableness" in order to
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. There is a strong presumption that
counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment. Strickland v. Washington, supra. As in a trial, at a suppression hearing, trial counsel
must make tactical decisions: how to impeach the officer, whether to call certain witnesses or
admit certain evidence. Our Court of Appeals has had numerous occasions to discuss the type of
conduct which constitutes a tactical decision. Cross-examination strategy is a tactical decision.
Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233,246,233 P.3d 164,177 (Ct.App.2010). The decision of what
witnesses to call is also a tactical decision State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 563, 199 P.3d 123, 138
(2008). Likewise, the decision of what evidence should be introduced at trial is also tactical.
Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct.App.2005).
Because the failure to call a witness is a tactical decision, Ellis must show that his lawyer
was either unprepared or ignorant of the law when he decided not to call the parole officer in
order for the Court to find counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. Ellis brought to
his lawyer's attention that the report of the parole violations, dated March 23, 2010, did not
include the DVDs found in the storage room and it was never amended to include the violations
found as a result of the search of the storage room. Ellis admitted that he told his counsel this
report existed and counsel submitted the report in his Amended Motion to Suppress. Aff. of Ellis
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in Response at 2. However, he did not the call the parole officer as a witness to show this was a
"rogue" search as argued by Ellis. The evidence presented by Ellis shows that his lawyer was
not unprepared because, based on Ellis' own assertions, he told his lawyer his theory and his
lawyer approached the presentation of evidence differently. This is the type of tactical decision
that defense counsel make, as a matter oflaw, his counsel's performance was not objectively
unreasonable.
Furthermore, Ellis has not shown prejudice: that if his attorney had subpoenaed the parole
officer as a witness the result of the suppression hearing would have been different. The Court
found Ellis had waived his Fourth Amendment as a part of his parole agreement which was still
in effect when law enforcement entered his apartment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
validity of the search. Whether or not the parole agent amended his report to include the
violations found as a result of the search is simply irrelevant to the issues in the suppression
hearing. The petitioner has failed to show either deficient performance or that he was prejudiced
by the approach that his counsel took during the hearing.
Likewise, Ellis has not shown that his attorney's decision to rest on his briefing and not
give additional oral argument was objectively unreasonable. After learning the Court had
already read his briefing, counsel gave a short argument and rested. Tr.6: 18-25, 7:9. Ellis has
not provided any evidence of additional argument that should have been given or that a different
result would have been achieved if counsel had made additional argument. Ellis has failed to
provide any evidence to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test and his claim will be
summarily dismissed.
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2. It is Not Objectively Unreasonable to Allow a Legal Intern to Work on a Case.
Ellis argues his counsel was ineffective by allegedly allowing a legal intern to negotiate
his plea deal, write the motion to suppress and otherwise work on his case. To justify an
evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must tender a factual showing based on evidence that would
be admissible at the hearing. Ellis makes the conclusory allegation that the "motion to suppress
could not have been written by a competent attorney." Aff. of Ellis in Response at 4. Eilis's
allegations are not supported by any evidence the intern's perfonnance was objectively
unreasonable. Presumably, Ellis believed that having an intern work on a case is primafacie
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, no case law supports this notion. This
claim will be summarily dismissed because it is not supported by any evidence and does not
justify relief as a matter of law.

3. Failure to Review DVDs Containing Child Pornography Claim was Not Objectively
Unreasonable or Prejudicial
Ellis argues that "he should have been able to review the discovery information" and
alleged that he had not reviewed the actual DVDs which formed the basis of each count of
possession of exploitive material. At the pretrial conference, held June 8, 2011, Ellis decided to
change his plea to guilty. When he informed the Court that he had not reviewed discovery, the
Court allowed a one-week continuance to allow Ellis to review discovery. Ellis indicated to the
Court that he was willing to enter a plea without viewing the DVDs, however, the Court
continued the hearing expressly to give him a chance to review any discovery he wanted to
review. At the next hearing, June 13,201 I, the discovery was discussed. His attorney and Ellis
had decided not to review the DVDs. He advised that Ellis reviewed all other evidence and still
wanted to plead guilty. Tr. at 18. Later, Ellis admitted to downloading a video "that involved
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sexual activity of prepubescent males with adult males" (Tr., 29:24-25) and a video that involved
"children aged three to older who were being involved in sexual activity with adult males" (Tr.,
30:9-11 ). Since he had downloaded the material himself, it is pretty obvious that he was familiar
with it.

In Eilis's responsive affidavit, he alleged he was "scared" and '1ust said what I thought
would make the court happy about the questions asked" when he entered his guilty plea. Aff. of
Ellis in Response at 5. Ellis is clearly speaking of the continued hearing that occurred on June
13, 2011. However, the record of the June 8, 2011 hearing contradicts Eilis's allegation that he
did not want to plead guilty without reviewing the DVDs. On June 8, 2011, after learning that
Ellis had not reviewed the DVDs the Court decided to postpone the guilty plea hearing to allow
Ellis time to review all discovery. When the Court was speaking with Counsel and trying to
determine a new date, Ellis tried to interrupt the Court so that he could continue on with the
guilty plea hearing.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, he has a comment for the court.
Maybe that would be THE COURT: We can set if for 9:30 on Monday, since you are
here already, counsel. But, that's what I need, is to - I want to
know that he's been fully advised of the discovery, that he has
gone over the discovery, and that he is comfortable and
understands his rights and his defenses and the consequences of a
guilty plea and that he is prepared to go forward at that time.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, he is telling me that he has been told
what's on the DVDs and to his satisfaction he believes that's what
is there without actually having to see them.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will set it over for Monday at 9:30.
MR. SMITH: Okay.
Tr., 16: 16-25, 17: 1-7. When the Court considers summary dismissal, it must construe disputed
facts in the petitioner's favor; but if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the
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record of the criminal proc~edings, it may swnmarily dismiss the claim. In this case, the record
shows that Ellis wanted to plead guilty, despite having not reviewed the DVDs because he
believed what was on them.
Even if the Court found that his lawyer's performance was objectively unreasonable
because he did not review the DVDs with Ellis prior to Eilis's guilty plea, Ellis has still not come
forward with any evidence establishing prejudice. At his plea, he said that he downloaded the
material on the DVD's himself. There is nothing in the record that would support the conclusion
that ifhe had reviewed them he would not have accepted the State's plea deal and gone to trial
on all of the charges against him. Without any evidence that he would have proceeded to trial
had he reviewed all of the discovery, Ellis has failed to show he was prejudiced. Ellis cannot
make a primafacie case and this claim will be summarily dismissed.

4. Failure to Review PSI was Not Prejudicial
Ellis argues that his attorney's failure to review the PSI with him was ineffective
assistance of counsel. The transcript of the hearing shows that the Court asked his counsel if he
wanted to make changes or corrections to the presentence report and counsel did so. It is
apparent that his attorney did discuss the presentence report with Ellis. Even assuming, for the
purpose of this Decision that he failed to do so, he does not point to any errors. He was asked at
sentencing if he had comments and he made some. Moreover, the sentence imposed was the
sentence contemplated by the plea bargain agreement. To show prejudice, Ellis must show that
the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different. Other than vague, conclusory
assertions, the petitioner has failed to show that even if his assertions were true, he was
prejudiced in any fashion.
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v.
Conclusion

The Court is giving Notice to Ellis of its intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction
relief. A claim that a defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea is
actually a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. With regards to Eilis's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, he has failed to allege facts to create a prima facie case for
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the attorney's decision to not provide additional oral
argument or not call certain witnesses at the suppression hearing is a matter of trial strategy,
therefore, Ellis is required to come forward with evidence his attorney was unprepared and he
has not. Ellis has also not come forward with any evidence that he was prejudiced by his
attorney's conduct at the suppression hearing. Second, even if it is true that an intern worked on
Eilis's case, that alone is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, the record contradicts
Eilis's claim that he did not want to plead guilty without reviewing the DVDs. Furthermore,
even ifit was objectively unreasonable of his lawyer not to review the DVDs with Ellis, Ellis
has not shown he was prejudiced, an essential element of the claim. And finally, even if Ellis did
not review the PSI, Ellis has not presented any evidence to indicate that if he had, the result of
the sentencing hearing would have been different. Again, without evidence of prejudice, Ellis
fails to make a prima facie claim for relief. When each essential element of a claim is
unsupported by admissible evidence it will be summarily dismissed. Ellis has failed to meet his
burden to establish each essential element of his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and
his petition for post-conviction relief will be summarily dismissed.
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Ellis has twenty (20) days to respond to this Notice.
Dated this ~~[Febr uary, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 4<h day of February, 2015, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MAIL
MARK ELLIS #65365
IMS!
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
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) ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
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_______________
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)

This action has been brought under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, §§ 194901 through 19-4911. The reasons for dismissal were set out in this Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss filed on February 4, 2015. Ellis submitted a very thorough Response' on February 23,
2015. Although he generally rehashes arguments raised in his petition, he did bring up several
new facts that warrant brief discussion.
First, Ellis claims he suffers from Asperger's syndrome which caused anxiety and
affected his ability to interact with the court during his Guilty Plea Hearing. He states,
Yes, I understood some of what was going on, but some I did not,
especially in open court with all these people. At times I was
concentrating intensely on not having a full out panic attack in
front of everyone. I should have expressed my concerns about
everything I have claimed in this affidavit thouroughly (sic) to the

1

His Response was notarized.
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court while I was in front of the Judge. Please understand I could
not.

Response, p. 9. The Court notes that Ellis has not made the claim that his guilty plea was not
competently entered, only that the Court should have been concerned about his competence. In
fact, the Court was. The record of the Guilty Plea Hearing reflects that the Court questioned
Ellis extensively on his mental health prior to finding him competent to enter his guilty plea.
During the questioning, Ellis engaged in meaningful dialogue with the Court and there is no
indication that his anxiety levels were preventing him from expressing any concerns with the
Court.
Q. [By the Court]: . . . Now, do you suffer from any mental or
psychological disorders that would have a bearing on this case?

A. {By the Defendant]: I suffer from mental illness, but I don't
think it would be relevant, no, ma'am.
Q. Well, I noticed in your questionnaire that you said that you
previously had been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder.

A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What did you get Social Security Disability for?
A. Mental health issues that I wrote down.

Q. So you listed as major affective depressive disorder,
schizotypal personality disorder, social phobia, panic attacks, and
agoraphobia?

A. Yes.
Q, Now, in the past have you received treatment for those

conditions?
A. In the - yes.

Q. You say that you are not currently receiving any medication for
that?

A. No, I'm not.
Q. Okay. Why is that?

A. The institution is not - they can't treat personality
disorders. That's what I was told there.
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Q. Is your primary problem personality disorder and agoraphobia?

A. Pretty much, yes, ma'am.
Q. Now, sometimes they treat agoraphobia with antianxiety
medications.

A. They won't allow that.
Q. Okay. But you had also at one point suffered from a
depressive disorder?
A. I still do.
Q. Are you having trouble concentrating?

A. I'm very anxious, but I understand what is going on.
Q. Okay. Do you have any trouble reading and understanding
what you are reading?

A. No, ma'am.
Q. Have you had any trouble understanding your attorney?

A. No.
Q. Are you having any problems understanding what's going on

today?

A. No.
Q. So you can watch TV and understand what's on?
A. Yes.
Q. You can read and you understand what you are reading?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You may feel some level of anxiety, but you can still
function?

A. Yes.
Tr., p. 24-26. The record shows that the Court was aware he was suffering from agoraphobia
and panic attacks, but there is no indication Ellis was unable to proceed with entering his guilty
plea. Any claim that his anxiety, brought on by Asperger's Syndrome, prevented him from
accurately assessing his situation and participating in the Guilty Plea Hearing is belied by the
record which shows he engaged in meaningful dialogue with the Court. When a petitioner's
claims are belied by the record, they do not create a genuine issue of material fact. The
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additional facts that he raises in his Response do not create a genuine issue of
material fact, nor
do they form the basis of a valid claim.
Second, Ellis submitted four letters sent from the paralegal at Mackenzie Law
which
discussed the Suppression Hearing in the underlying criminal case. The letters
do not show
counsel was unprepared to give oral argument at the Suppression Hearing. To
the contrary, they
show counsel was actively preparing for the Suppression Hearing. The letters
do not create an
issue of material fact as to whether his attorney was unprepared for the Suppres
sion Hearing and
do not form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Considering his most recent filings, the Petitioner has not asserted any new evidenc
e
which creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding his previously raised claims
and has not
asserted a genuine issue of material fact regarding any new claim for post-conviction

relief. As

such, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 19-4906(b), on the basis of the application and
the record in the
underlying case, it appears that Ellis's application is without merit The Court
is satisfied that
Ellis is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that no purpose would be served
by any further
proceedings. Ellis's application for post-conviction relief is DISMISSED.

~

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

(..--da y of-'-t,t l71i:;: ::;~--'
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